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COMMENTS
Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jm·isdiction and the
Fundamental Test of Fairness
The study of long-arm1 and quasi in rem2 jurisdiction has occupied the attention of many commentators in recent years. 8 These
I. The term "long-arm jurisdiction" refers to the personal jurisdiction that a court
may exert over a nonresident defendant even though he is not personally served with
process within the state. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE &: FEDERAL COURTS 375-79 (Official Draft 1969).
2. The term "quasi in rem jurisdiction" refers to the jurisdiction that a court may
exert over a defendant which is based on attachment or garnishment procedures and
which enables the court to adjudicate the merits of an in personam claim. Absent in
personam jurisdiction, however, the plaintiff in a quasi in rem action may recover only
the amount of the property that was the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction. F.
JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 630-34 (1965).
3. See, e.g., Auerbach, The "Long-Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 Mn. L. REv. 13
(1966); Brown, Long Arm Statute for Massachusetts, 74 CoM. L.J. 202 (1969); Carting•
ton, The Modem Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 303 (1962);
Carrington &: Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66
MICH. L. REV. 227 (1967); Clifford, Colorado's "Short-Arm" Jurisdiction, 37 CoLo. L.
R.Ev. 309 (1965); Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live
Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 285 (1958); Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and
Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73
(1968); Friedman, Extension of the Illinois Long Arm Statute: Divorce and Separate
Maintenance, 16 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 45 (1966); Garfinkel 8: Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction
in California Under New Section 410:10 of Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HAsT1NGS L.J.
1163 (1970); Green, Jurisdictional Reform in California, 21 HAsTINGS L.J. 1219 (1970);
Hawley, The Long Arm from the Northwest, 5 IDAHO L. REv. 131 (1968); Hazard, .A
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 241; Herget, Local Gov•
ernmental Reform and the Jurisdiction Problem: A Legal Blue Print, 18 DEPAUL L.
REV. 119 (1968); Hamburger, The Reach of New York's Long Arm Statute: Today and
Tomorrow, 15. BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 61 (1965); Hamburger &: Laufer, Expanding Jurisdiction over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16
BUFFALO L. REV. 67 (1966); Horowitz, BASES OF JURISDICTION OF CALIFORNIA COURTS To
RENDER JUDGMENTS AGAINSf FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND NON-RESIDENT INDIVIDUALS, 31
S. CAL. L. REv. 339 (1958); Jacobson, The Enlargement of Jurisdiction over Unlicensed
Foreign Corporations in Missouri-The "Single-Act Statute", 31 U.K.C. L. REv. 292
(1963); Johnston, The Fallacy of Physical Power, 1 JOHN MARsHALL J. PRACTICE 8: PRO•
CEDURE 37 (1967); Jax, "Long Arm" Statute for Indiana, 2 IND. LEGAL F. 85 (1968);
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdic•
tion of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 569
(1958); Levin, "Long Arm" Statutes and Product Liability, 5 CAN. YB. INTL. L. 331
(1967); Pizzedaz, Ohio's Long Arm Statute, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 363 (1966); Schwartz,

Towards a More Convenient Forum in Products Liability Litigation: Developments in
Conflict of Laws and Long Arm Statutes, 32 ATL. L.J. 100 (1968); Scott, Hanson v.
Denckla, 72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 695 (1959); Seidelson, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long Arm Statutes, 6 DUQUESNE L. REv.
221 (1968); Shepard, How Long Is the Long Arm of Due Process, 34 !Ns. CouNsEL L.J.
297 (1967); Smithers, Virginia's "Long Arm" Statute: An Argument for Constitutionality of Jurisdiction over Nonresident Individuals, 51 VA. L. REv. 712 (1965); Stein, Ju•
risdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1075 (1968); Thode,
In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 20:JJB, the Texas "Long-Arm" Statute; and the Appearance To Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 279
(1964); Towe, Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Residents and Montana's New Rule 4B,
24 MONT. L. R.Ev. 3 (1962); Twerski, Return to Jurisdictional Due Process-The Case
for the Vanishing Defendant, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 265 (1970); van Mehren &: Trautman,
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commentators have generally sought to clarify the limitations on the
exercise of jurisdiction that are imposed on the courts by the due
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966); Weiss•
man, Georgia Long-Arm Statute; A Significant Advance in the Concept of Personal
Jurisdiction, 4 GEORGIA ST. B.J. 13 (1967); Woods, The Uniform Long-Arm Act in Ar•
kansas: The Far Side of Jurisdiction, 22 ARK. L. REv. 627 (1969); Zabin, Long Arm
Statute: International Shoe Comes to Massachusetts, 54 MAss. L.Q. 101 (1969); Com•
ment, Minimum Contacts Confused and Reconfused-Variations on a Theme by Inter•
national Shoe-Or, Is This Trip Necessary?, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 304 (1970); Comment,
The "Long-Arm" Statute: Wyoming Expands Jurisdiction of the State Courts over Non•
Residents, 4 LAND &: WATER L. REv. 235 (1969); Comment, Search for the Most Con•
venient Federal Forum: Three Solutions to the Problem of Multidistrict Litigation, 64
Nw. U. L. REv. 188 (1969); Comment, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations in Pennsylvania: A Time for Change, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 81 (1969); Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Individuals: A Long-Term Statute Proposed for California, 9
SANTA CLARA LAW. 313 (1969); Comment, Oregon "Long-Arm" Statute: Two Recent
Cases, 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 589 (1969); Comment, Jurisdiction in Rem and the Attach•
ment of Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725; Comment, The
Erie Rule and Long-Arm Statutes, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 116 (1968); Comment, Jurisdiction
-Long-Arm Statute-Doing Business-Commission of Tort, 8 NAT. R.Es. J. 348 (1968);
Comment, Podolsky v. Devinney and the Garnishment of Intangibles: A Chip off the
Old Balk, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426 (1968); Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New
Chapter in Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 769 (1967); Comment, Constitutional Limitations to Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper Libel Cases, 34 U. CHI.
L. REv. 436 (1967); Comment, Long·Arm Jurisdiction over Publishers: To Chill a
Mocking Word, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 342 (1967); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles:
Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550 (1967);
Comment, How Minimum Is "Minimum Contact"? An Examination of "Long Arm"
Jurisdiction, 9 S. TEX, L.J. 184 (1967); Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Residents-The Louisiana "Long-Arm" Statute, 40 TuL. L. REv. 366 (1966); Comment,
Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Residents: Some Statutory Developments, 7 WM. &:
MARY L. REV. 146 (1966); Comment, Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Manufacturers in
New York: The Long-Arm Amputated, 7 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. REv. 135 (1965); Comment, Transacting Business as Jurisdictional Basis-A Survey of New York Case Law,
14 BUFFALO L. REV. 525 (1965); Comment, Tortious Act as a Basis for Jurisdiction in
Products Liability Cases, 33 FORDHAM L. REv. 671 (1965); Comment, In Personam Ju•
risdiction over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Cases, 63 MICH, L. REv.
1928 (1965); Comment, Jurisdiction Under "Long-Arm" Statute over Breach of Warranty Actions, 22 WASH, &: LEE L. REV. 152 (1965); Comment, Jurisdiction over NonResidents-The Washington "Long-Arm" Statute, 38 WASH. L. REv. 560 (1963); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960); Note, In
Personam Jurisdiction Expanded: Utah's Long Arm Statute, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 222;
Note, Jurisdiction in New York: A Proposed Reform, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 1412 (1969);
Note, Multi-State Defamation and the Long-Arm, 3 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRACTICE &:
PROCEDURE 118 (1969); Note, Long Arm Statute Jurisdiction When the Tortious Act
Occurs in One State, the Injurious Consequences in Another, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 410
(1969); Note, Procedure-The South Dakota Long Arm Statute-Ventling v. Kraft, 14
S.D. L. REv. 168 (1969); Note, Jurisdiction-Foreign Retailers: Due Process Limitations
on the Tortious Act Provision of the Washington Long-Arm Statute, 44 WASH, L. REv.
490 (1969); Note, Nonresident Jurisdiction and the New England Experience, 48 B.U.
L. REV. 373 (1968); Note, Interpretive Problems of Ohio's Long-Arm Statute, 19 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 347 (1968); Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1108 (1968); Note, Kentucky's Jurisdictional Bases-The Need for Change,
56 KY. L.J. 650 (1968); Note, First Amendment's Role in Determining Place of Trial
in Libel Actions, 66 MicH, L. REv. 542 (1968); Note, Expanding Permissible Bases of
Jurisdiction in Missouri: The New Long-Term Statute, 33 Mo. L. REv. 248 (1968);
Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58 (1968); Note,
Full Faith and Credit-Procedural Limitation Bars Sister State's Collateral Attack on
Jurisdiction, 22 Sw. L.J. 662 (1968); Note, Conflict of Laws-Limitation on
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 While their studies
have produced various well-refined analyses upon which several
courts have placed great reliance, 5 the refinements provided by these
analyses present their own dangers. An examination of cases decided
in recent years indicates that some courts, which have been preoccupied with applying these sophisticated approaches, have overlooked
some relatively obvious considerations that should have been determinative of the jurisdictional issues involved. As a result, excessive
time has been spent considering the jurisdictional issue, even though
that issue is a preliminary matter6 and, as such, should not be the
subject of extensive litigation.7 Furthermore, such unwarranted concern with the niceties of jurisdictional theory creates debatable issues and hence invites time-consuming appeals.
This Comment is focused upon the errors that may result from
"Any Act" Within the Scope of the Oklahoma Long-Arm Statute, 5 TULSA L.J. 87
(1968); Note, Jurisdiction-Long-Arm Statutes-Corporate Affiliations as a Basis for
Assuming Jurisdiction, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1228 (1968); Note, In Personam Jurisdiction
over Foreign Corporations: An Interest-Balancing Test, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 33 (1967);
Note, Can the "Long-Arm" Reach Out-of-State Publishers?, 43 NoTRE DAME LAw. 83
(1967); Note, Jurisdiction over a Foreign Corporation, 19 S. C. L. REv. 806 (1967);
Note, The Application of the First Amendment to Long Arm Jurisdiction, 21 Sw. L.J.
808 (1967); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN.
L. REv. 654 (1967); Note, Jurisdiction: "Long-Arm" Expansion, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 443
(1966); Note, Jurisdiction over Unregistered Foreign Corporations Doing Business in
Pennsylvania: Confusion in Perspective, 27 U. PITT. L. REv. 879 (1966); Note, Conflict
of Laws-Jurisdiction-Long-Arm Statute-Commission of a Tort, 44 ORE. L. REv. 131
(1965); Note, Expanded Basis of Jurisdiction-An Examination of Tennessee's New
"Long-Arm" Statute, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1484 (1965); Note, The Virginia "Long-Arm"
Statute, 51 VA. L. R.Ev. 719 (1965); Note, Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, Foreign Corporations and Minimum Contacts, 19 WYO. L.J. 75 (1965); Note, Some Problems Under
Iowa's Judicial Jurisdiction Statutes, 48 IowA L. REv. 968 (1963); Recent Decision, M
ALBANY L. REv. 752 (1970); Recent Decision, 6 GEORGIA ST. B.J. 202 (1969); Recent De•
velopment, 14 VILL. L. REv. 764 (1969); Decision, 4 TEXAS INTL. L.F. 213 (1968); Recent
Development, 41 CONN. B.J. 144 (1967); Recent Development, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 157
(1966); Recent Development, 66 CoLuM. L. REv. 199 (1966); Recent Development, 45
NEB. L. REv. 166 (1966).
4. Although it might once have been questioned whether the due process clause
should be the basis for the determination of the limitations on long-arm jurisdiction
(see notes 8-24 infra and accompanying text), there is now little doubt that this is the
proper standard. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877); SEC v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 748-50
(D. Md. 1968) (due process clause of fifth amendment); Kurland, supra note ll, at
572-73, 585.
5. See, e.g., Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 1967); Wilcox v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 270 F. Supp. 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Japan Gas Lighter Assn. v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 232 (D.N.J. 1966);
Long v. Mishicot Modem Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967).
6. Carrington & Martin, supra note 3, at 247. Cf. Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co., 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke,
Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
7. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE & FEDERAL COURTS
128 (Official Draft 1969). See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 u. CHI. L. R.Ev. I (1968).
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the confusion surrounding the question of jurisdictional limitations.
It is suggested that such confusion is the natural result of the prevailing concern of courts with the extreme limits of permissible jurisdiction, and that this confusion has so clouded the basic issues that
erroneous results have been reached in more routine cases that do
not even approach those limits-the "easy" cases. Cases decided in
the past few years indicate that these erroneous results occur most
often in three areas. Following a brief examination of the body of
law and theory applicable to jurisdiction over nonresidents, each of
those areas will be examined in some detail. While it is not suggested that these are the only areas in which confusion has led courts
to overlook basic considerations, they are representative of the problems and do serve to expose a dangerous trend in the determination
of jurisdictional limits.

I.

BRIEF HISTORY OF LONG-ARM JURISDICTION

A. The Early Doctrine

The power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who cannot
be found within the territorial limits of the forum state is meaningless unless a judgment obtained there can be enforced in a state in
which the defendant can be found. It would therefore be appropriate to determine the legitimacy of the assertion of jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant by reference to the enforceability of that
decision elsewhere. This approach appears to be consistent with the
jurisdictional allocation embodied in the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution, which requires each state to recognize the judicial decisions of its sister states.8 As early as 1850, in the case of
D'Arcy v. Ketchum,9 the Supreme Court held that this requirement
embraces only those decisions rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the defendant.10 Thus, the interrelationship under the full
faith and credit clause between the proper assertion of jurisdiction
and the interstate recognition of judgments rendered thereunder reflects the concept that "the limits of jurisdiction are to be set ... by
... principles relating to the need for reciprocal restraints on sovereignty in order to effect a harmony in the administration of justice
among the several states."11
8. U.S. CONST, art. 4, § I.
9. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).
10. The Supreme Court held that unless a defendant had "been served with process
or voluntarily made defence" a judgment rendered against him was not entitled to full
faith and credit. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 176.
11. State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 132-33, 448
P.2d 571, 576 (1967) CTustice O'ConneII, dissenting). See also Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 775 (1955), for a more thorough exposition of the limits of permissible jurisdiction as determined under the full faith and
credit clause.
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The judicial analysis of constitutional limits on jurisdiction,
however, has not been developed under full faith and credit principles; rather, it has proceeded under the principles of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 12 The current limits on jurisdiction might be considerably more stringent if the courts had
looked to the full faith and credit clause for guidance,13 since the
expansion in the permissive limits on jurisdiction that has taken
place under the due process approach may be at least partly attributable to the generally expansive view that the Supreme Court has
taken of the due process clause.14 On the other hand, regardless of
which constitutional provision was applied, the same Justices would
have decided the same cases and probably would have reached the
same conclusions. Full faith and credit limitations on in personam
jurisdiction might therefore have been identical to those that currently prevail under the due process clause. In this respect, it is revealing that in the first case applying the due process clause to jurisdiction, Pennoyer v. N eff,15 the Supreme Court arrived at a test identical to that announced in D'Arcy. 16
Despite these possible similarities in the ultimate results reached
under the two approaches, reference to the full faith and credit
clause for jurisdictional standards would have provided a different
emphasis from that which now prevails under due process analysis.
When a court's determination of jurisdiction depends on whether
the defendant has been deprived of due process, the emphasis of that
court will tend toward an examination of what is required by the
concept of "fundamental fairness" 17 toward the defehdant. In contrast, if the jurisdictional determination were based on the full faith
and credit clause, primary attention would be placed upon the enforceability of the ultimate decision elsewhere.18 The latter ap12. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV,§ I.
13. Development of the law applicable to jurisdictional limitations under this clause
would also be consistent with the historical purpose of the clause-the elimination of
the possibility that a defendant might render a judgment against him ineffective by
removing himself and his property from the state which had awarded that decision to
his adversary. See Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History,
39 ILL. L. R.Ev. 1, 18-19 (1944).
14. See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 673,
751 (1963).
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
16. Compare the test announced in D'Arcy, supra note 10, with that announced in
Pennoyer: in order for the court validly to determine "the personal liability of the de•
fendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the
State, or his voluntary appearance." 95 U.S. at 733.
17. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The fairness concept of
the due process clause has been construed as requiring that a determination of jurisdiction over a defendant be based on standards of "fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See text accompanying
notes 29-30 infra.
18. See White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121,130,448 P.2d 571, 575
(1968) Oustice O'Connell, dissenting)
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proach probably provides a more appropriate focus for a court's
attention, since proceedings by a court in order to reach a judgment
that cannot be enforced would serve no purpose. Moreover, attention focused on this consideration would probably lead to greater
judicial restraint-a virtue noticeably lacking in some cases19-because a court might consider its own unwillingness to enforce foreign judgments in similar cases before asserting jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant.2°
Although the full faith and credit clause may be preferable as a
basis for jurisdictional determinations, a return to it is unlikely. In
the classic decision of Pennoyer v. Nefj,21 the Court equated, for jurisdictional purposes, the full faith and credit clause with the due
process clause22 by holding that due process required "service of
process within the state of [the defendant's] voluntary appearance" 23
before in personam jurisdiction could be asserted. However, while
the language of Pennoyer is virtually identical to that of D' Arcy,24
the Pennoyer decision had the effect of making due process the primary consideration in jurisdictional inquiries. Thus, after Pennoyer
the question whether the judgment of a sister state would have to be
enforced turned completely on the question whether the sister state's
courts had complied with due process requirements.
As the nation grew, and the number and importance of interstate
transactions increased, it became clear that the traditionally exclusive means of attaching jurisdiction-service of process within the
state and voluntary appearance-were too restrictive. As a result,
exceptions to the rule were eventually developed for cases in which
the plaintiff's state could claim an urgent interest. For example,
in Hess v. Pawloski25 the Supreme Court held that one who brought
19. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966): "[I]f [the] limits of state jurisdiction as set out in the statute fall well within the scope of due process, this does not restrict the courts and prohibit them from extending their jurisdiction to the limits of due process ••••"
20. See Aucoin v. Hanson, 207 S.2d 834, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (Judge Hood, dissenting): "If the rule applied by·the majority in this case is finally held to be the correct one, then I think we will have to face the fact that a rule similar to the one which
we apply here may also be applied by courts of other states. We will have to recognize
and enforce judgments rendered by courts of other states against absent Louisiana residents ••••"
21. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For a thorough analysis of the case, see Hazard, supra note 3,
at 245•81.
22. "The great importance of Pennoyer v. Neff is that it identified the test under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause with the test under the Due Process Clause ••••"
Kurland, supra note 3, at 585. See also von Mehren &: Trautman, supra note 3, at 1126.
However, it appears that in a limited number of cases-primarily involving divorce-a
decision may comply with due process requirements yet not be entitled to full faith
and credit. See Rodgers &: Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit: The Case of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 1363 (1967).
23. 95 U.S. at 733.
24. See note IO supra.
25. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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a dangerous instrument, such as an automobile, into a state could be
said to have consented to the appointment of that state's secretary of
state as his agent for service of process. In Henry L. Doherty & Company v. Goodman,26 the Court, recognizing the special interest of a
state in regulating the sale of securities, held that the defendant, who
had sent an agent into Iowa to sell securities, could be said to have
consented to service of process on him through that agent. However,
such exceptions were limited, and the constitutionality of extending
them further was in serious doubt. As late as 1935 one prominent
authority indicated that a general statute that provided that doing
acts within a state would indicate consent to the jurisdiction of that
state's courts "even as to causes of action arising out of the doing of
the acts ... would be unconstitutional ...." 27

B. International Shoe and the Modern Doctrine
Against this background, the Supreme Court decided five cases
over a span of thirteen years that cumulatively had the effect of virtually overruling the Pennoyer test for determining the legitimacy
of in personam jurisdiction.28 In the first of these cases, International
Shoe Company v. W ashington,29 the Court held that "due process
requires only that ... [the defendant] have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " 3°Five years later, in 1950, the Court held in Travelers Health
Association v. Virginia81 that the solicitation within a state of new
members by a nonprofit organization through the unpaid services of
existing members satisfied this minimum-contacts test. In 1957, the
decision in McGee v. International Life Insurance Company 32 extended the minimum-contacts theory even further. The Court held
in that case that the sale of a single life insurance policy within
California was a sufficient contact for the California courts to assert
jurisdiction in an action by the beneficiary against the insurer.38 This
26. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
27. I J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 358-59 (1935).
28. But see Hartsog v. Robinson, 115 Ga. App. 824, 156 S.E.2d 141 (1967), in which
a Georgia court apparently followed the Pennoyer test in holding that service of pro•
cess within the state was essential unless the defendant could be said to have impliedly
given his consent to the assertion of jurisdiction over him.
29. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
30. 326 U.S. at 316. In SEC v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 748-50 (D. Md. 1968), the
court held that this test also applies to the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
31. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
32. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
33. The facts of McGee have led casebook authors to wonder whether there would
be sufficient contacts if the insured had lived elsewhere and moved to California after
taking out the policy. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON &: D. CURRIE, CONFUCT OF LAws 468 (1968).
In a case approaching this hypothetical, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
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conclusion was reached even though the defendant had not originally
issued the policy but had purchased it from the prior insurer.34
Meanwhile, in 1952, the Court had provided an alternative to the
minimum-contacts test by its holding in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company 35 that jurisdiction could be asserted against
a nonresident defendant even though the cause of action did not
arise out of the defendant's activities within the state, provided the
defendant had "substantial," as opposed to "minimum," contacts.36
Some authors have suggested that Perkins does not provide sound
authority for the application of the lesser standard embodied in a
substantial-contacts test, since the peculiar facts of that case distinguish it significantly from the usual jurisdictional dispute. 37 In Perkins, although the defendant's center of activities was in the Philippine Islands, the wartime occupation by the Japanese prevented
litigation in that forum. Since, of the forums available to the plaintiff, Ohio was the one with which the defendant had the most significant contacts, the action was brought there. The case might,
therefore, merely stand for the rather obvious proposition that the
best available forum is constitutionally acceptable. However, nothing in the opinion suggests this approach, and the greater weight of
authority appears to support the view that "substantial contacts" are
sufficient for jurisdiction even if the cause of action did not arise out
of those contacts.38
Thus, as a result of these four decisions, the due process requirements for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction had become considerably less stringent than those which existed under the old
Pennoyer rule. In 1958 the Court made it clear, however, that due
process limitations had not completely disappeared, by holding, in
held that the Massachusetts courts had jurisdiction over a dispute between a Massachusetts assignee of an insurance policy originally issued to a New York resident by a com•
pany that had no contacts with Massachusetts other than communications with the
plaintiff and the mailing of a replacement policy to him in Boston. Wolfman v. Modern Life Ins. Co., 352 Mass. 356, 225 N.E.2d 598, appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 153 (1967).
34. 355 U.S. at 221.
35. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
36. The Court indicated that the assertion of jurisdiction was by no means required. Judicial restraint might indicate that constitutionally permissible jurisdiction
should not be exercised. 342 U.S. at 445-46.
37. See H. GOODRICH &: E. SCOLES, CONFLicr OF LAws 134 (4th ed. 1964); G. STUM•
BERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICI'S OF LAws 95-96 (1963); von Mehren &: Trautman, supra
note 3, at 1144.
38. See, e.g., Pujol v. United States Life Ins. Co., 396 F.2d 430, 431-32 (1st Cir.
1968); Lindley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 276 F. Supp. 83, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1967),
revd,, 407 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1968); Gordon v. International Tel. &: Tel. Corp., 273 F.
Supp. 164, 167 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Corporate Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Warren-Teed Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 99 N.J. Super. 493, 497, 240 A.2d 450, 452 (L. Div. 1968); A. EHRENZWEIG, CoNFLICI' OF LAWS 113 (1962). See also Stewart v. Bus &: Car Co., 293 F. Supp.
577, 584 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
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Hanson v. Denckla,39 that "it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the. forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 40 While this decision
indicated that restraints exist as "a consequence of the territorial
limitations on the power of the respective states,"41 it did not precisely define those restraints. The case has therefore caused a considerable amount of confusion among the courts.42
One court limited the application of the Hanson decision to
cases in which the cause of action did not arise out of the defendant's
acts within the forum state.43 Another interpreted it as requiring a
voluntary association in addition to minimum contacts.44 While the
latter interpretation seems justified in view of the "purposeful act"
language in Hanson, it is probably wrong. This "voluntary association" approach is certainly contrary to the rationale of several cases
that have upheld jurisdiction over suppliers of goods that have had
harmful effects within the forum state.45 The fact that the defendants in such cases had not voluntarily associated themselves with
the forum states suggests that Hanson might most properly be characterized as requiring some purposeful act by the defendant and an
association with the state resulting from that act, rather than voluntary and knowing association with the state.
Perhaps the clearest example of the confusion that followed
Hanson can be found in the Arizona case of Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corporation. 46 In the process of remanding the case before
it to the trial court for a further determination of facts, the Arizona
supreme court declared that Hanson could not be literally construed.
The court reasoned that requiring a purposeful act of the defendant
would involve an intolerable revitalization of the implied-consent
test which had existed prior to International Shoe. The court also
felt that because a negligent act is_ by definition not purposeful, it
would be inappropriate to apply the Hanson purposeful-act doctrine
to defendants in negligence actions.47 However, as in the cases dis39. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
40. 357 U.S. at 253.
41. 357 U.S. at 251.
42. One authority described Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Hanson as having
"reached the fair result •.• by a line of analysis that ••• is impossible to follow ••••"
Hazard, supra note 3, at 244.
43. Knight v. San Jacinto Club, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 81, 232 A.2d 462 (L. Div. 1967).
44. Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966).
45. See, e.g., Consolidated Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d 797
(7th Cir. 1967); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965);
Gray v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961). Cf. Wolfman v. Modern Life Ins. Co., 352 Mass. 356, 225 N.E.2d 598, appeal
dismissed, 389 U.S. 153 (1967). See also Carrington&: Martin, supra note 3, at 299.
46. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
47. 100 Ariz. at 256, 413 P.2d at 735.
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cussed above48 in which voluntary association was required, the
Phillips court placed undue emphasis upon finding some relationship between the act that gives rise to the claim and the act that provides the requisite nexus between the defendant and the forum.
Since Hanson v. Denckla requires only "that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,"49 it is clear that the act
that provides the nexus between the defendant and the forum need
not be the same act upon which the cause of action is based. Hence,
the fact that misconduct is negligent rather than intentional should
not affect a determination of jurisdiction under Hanson.
These cases are indicative of the confusion that has engulfed the
courts as they have attempted to determine the constitutional limits
on their power to adjudicate. 50 Another symptom of this confusion
48. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
49. 357 U.S. at 253.
50. The limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction are derived from state statutes as
well as from the Constitution. See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 998-1017 (1960). But see note 19 supra.
The Rhode Island legislature has authorized its courts to exercise jurisdiction "in
every case not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or laws of the United
States." R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-5-33 (1969). Similarly, a recent amendment to the
California Code of Civil Procedure enables California courts to "exercise jurisdiction
on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States.'' CAL. C1v. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West Supp. 1970). While most state statutes indicate some greater limitation, many have been interpreted as providing for jurisdiction
whenever constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., San Juan Hotel Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 277
F. Supp. 28 (D.P.R. 1967), and Executive Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 254
F. Supp. 415 (D.P.R. 1966) (both applying 32 P.R. LAws ANN. app. II, R. 4.7 (Supp.
1965), as amended, 9 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 32, app. II, R. 4.7 (1968)); Grobark v. Addo
Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959), and Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378,
143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) (both applying !LL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1955), as
amended, !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1965)). In such states it is perhaps not surprising to find significant expansions in the interpretation of statutory definitions in
order that jurisdiction might be asserted. Thus, a "tortious act" has been held to mean
any act that may result in the collection of damages from the actor, Poindexter v.
Willis, 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 217-18, 231 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1967), and the breach of a contract
has been held to be a tort in itself, Coletti v. Ovaltine Food Prods., 274 F. Supp. 719,
721-23 (D.P.R. 1967).
On the other hand, some jurisdictional statutes are quite clearly limited and have
been accepted as such by the courts. Compare, e.g., Beaty v. M.S. Steel Co., 276 F.
Supp. 259 (D. Md. 1967), afjd., 401 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049
(1969), with Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961). See also Optico Corp. v. Standard Tool Co., 285 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.
Pa. 1968); Cecere v. Ohringer Home Furniture Co., 208 Pa. Super. 138, 220 A.2d 350
(1966).
The standards prescribed in the UNIFORM INTERSTATE & INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE
Acr § 1.03 provide a potential for uniformity in the determination of statutory limits:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly
or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state
if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state; [or]
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may be seen in apparently inconsistent decisions involving the mass
media: one court has held that the producer of a national television
show is subject to jurisdiction wherever that program is broadcast,111
while another has held that a syndicated columnist is not subject to
jurisdiction wherever her column is published. 112 Moreover, a court's
concern with the permissible reach of the long-arm statute may so
overwhelmingly dominate its thinking that it will fail to consider
properly other jurisdictional issues. For example, in a case involving
the reach of the Oregon long-arm statute, neither the district court
nor the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit paid significant attention to the fact that the defendant was probably not amenable to
suit in the federal courts regardless of the propriety of applying the
long-arm.113
In reaction to this confusion, dissenting opinions have been written in two recent state court cases expressing complete dissatisfaction
with the permissive jurisdictional standards applied by the respective majority opinions to nonresident defendants. 54 Both of these
dissents recognize the inherent danger to a coordinated system of
state courts in the unwarranted extension of long-arm jurisdiction.
Both also express a desire to approach the question by reference to
the full faith and credit clause. 55 In the language of Justice O'Connell of the Supreme Court of Oregon, "a state must test its jurisdiction in each case by putting itself in the position of a sister state
called upon to enforce a judgment sought by the plaintiff." 116 None(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state [; or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state
at the time of contracting].
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this Section, only a
[cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this Section
may be asserted against him.
As of August 1969 the Act had been adopted in Arkansas, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and the Virgin Islands. NATL. CONFERENCE OF CoMl\ms. ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 193 (1969). See also Leflar, Act JOI-Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act, 17 .ARK. L. REv. 118 (1963); Woods, The Uniform
Long-Arm Act in Arkansas: The Far Side of Jurisdiction, 22 .ARK. L. R.Ev. 627 (1969).
51. Pegler v. Sullivan, 6 Ariz. App. 338, 432 P.2d 593 (1967).
52. Riverhouse Publishing Co. v. Porter, 287 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.!. 1968).
53. Portland Paramount Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 258 F. Supp.
962 (D. Ore. 1966), revd., 383 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1967). The district court held that the
defendant, Elizabeth Taylor, had committed a tortious act within Oregon if she deliberately had given a bad performance in a motion picture that she knew would be
distributed in Oregon. 258 F. Supp. at 966. It was stipulated in the case that Miss Taylor
was a citizen of the United States but not of any one state, 258 F. Supp. at 963-64 n.2,
a fact that should have made her citizenship nondiverse with any plaintiff and thereby
rendered her not amenable to federal diversity jurisdiction. See Twentieth-CenturyFox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
54. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 128, 448 P.2d 571, 574
(1968) Gustice O'Connell, dissenting); Aucoin v. Hanson, 207 S.2d 834, 838 (La. Ct. App.
1968) Gudge Hood, dissenting).
55. See notes 8-20 supra and accompanying text.
56. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 130, 448 P.2d 571, 575
(1968) Gustice O'Connell, dissenting).

Comments

December 1970)

311

theless, while such a reversion to the full faith and credit clause
might reduce the confusion surrounding the jurisdictional question,
it is unlikely that such a reversion is possible, and it is at least questionable whether it would accomplish the desired objectives of coordination and judicial restraint. 5 7
C.

The Search for a Standard

At least part of the confusion surrounding the limitations on
jurisdiction must be attributed to the lack of a more definitive test
than "fair play" that may be applied to the hard cases that approach
the fringes of permissible jurisdiction. Response to this need for a
more precise test has not been entirely lacking. Indeed, since the
standard that evolves from analysis depends largely on the focus
of the analyst, it should not be surprising that at least five different
approaches have been advanced.
One relatively mechanical test that has emerged from the cases
calls for an assessment of the number of contacts that the defendant
has had with the forum state and a determination whether these contacts are sufficient to justify the assertion of jurisdiction. This approach raises the question of what is "sufficient,'' 58 and embroils the
courts in a meaningless battle of numbers in an effort to ascertain
how many contacts were made and to determine how many are
needed. An illustrative case is Buckley v. New York Times Company,tm in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the New York Times had insufficient contacts with Louisiana on
which to base the assertion of jurisdiction by a federal district court
in that state. The majority found that the Times' only connections
with the state were "the sending of less than a thousandth of one per
cent ... of its newspapers to subscribers and independent distributors in Louisiana; the occasional solicitation of advertising (... less
than one thousandth of one per cent ...) by travelling representatives . . . and the occasional sending of staff reporters to Louisiana
on special assignments ...." 60 Judge Brown, on the other hand, dissented because he felt that sufficient contacts had been established by
57. See text accompanying notes 15 8e 21-24 supra.
58. One authority has set up the following guidelines:
If there are substantial contacts with the state, ••. and if the cause of action arises
of [sic] the business done in the state, jurisdiction will be sustained. If there are
substantial contacts with the state, but the cause of action does not arise out of
these contacts, jurisdiction may be sustained. If there is a minimum of contacts,
and the cause of action arises out of the contacts, it will normally be fair and
reasonable to sustain jurisdiction. If there is a minimum of contacts and the cause
of action does not arise out of the contacts, there will normally be no basis of juris•
diction, since it is difficult to establish the factors necessary to meet the fair and
reasonable test.
2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 4.25[5], at 1173 (2d ed. 1967). Of course, this test leaves
open the question of what constitutes "minimum" and "substantial."
59. 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964).
60. 338 F.2d at 473-74.
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the paper's "La]verage circulation[,] [which] in 1962 for the daily
Times was 391 and for its celebrated Sunday edition, 1784."61 As
Buckley therefore demonstrates, the sufficient-contacts test, relying as
it does on arbitrary numerical comparison, is capable of neither
simple nor uniform application.
A second standard that has been utilized by some courts involves
applying factors that have been treated in the various Supreme
Court cases as either essential to or deserving of great weight in
the determination whether a court may assert jurisdiction over a
nonresident. Under this approach, three factors must coincide in
order for a state court to properly attach in personam jurisdiction:
(1) the defendant must purposefully have done some act within the
state; 62 (2) the cause of action must arise from or be connected with
that act; 63 and (3) the assertion of jurisdiction must not offend traditional standards of fair play. 64 The primary fault with this approach
is that it is unnecessarily restrictive-while a court may be assured
that it does have jurisdiction if these three factors coincide, jurisdiction may also exist when they do not. For example, although the
second factor was not present in the Perkins case,65 jurisdiction was
properly recognized because of the substantial contacts existing between the defendant and the forum state. 66 The three-pronged test
does have the virtue of easy application, but that positive factor is
outweighed by its restrictiveness.
A third standard that has developed in the case law can be traced
to the Illinois supreme court's decision in Gray v. American Radiator b Standard Sanitary Corporation. 61 This standard, which in a
sense reverts to the "fair play" doctrine first developed in International Shoe,68 has been followed in a number of decisions. 69 Essen61. 338 F.2d at 475.
62. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
63. See Perkins v. l3enguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
64. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Tyee Constr. Co.
v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 115-16, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963). Accord,
Sun-X Intl. Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). In :Byham v. National
Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 56-57, 143 S.E.2d 225, 231-32 (1965), the court, after listing both those factors essential and those deserving weight (without differentiating),
added the following factors: the extent of assurance of actual notice to the defendant,
the interests of the state in protecting its residents, the availability of courts in the foreign forum, the inconvenience to the nonresident, the availability of witnesses, the
amount of the claim involved, and the limitations of the state statute. It would appear
that, except for the last, these factors are merely components of the fair-play standard.
65. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
66. See also text accompanying notes 45-47 supra, suggesting that a nexus between
the act giving rise to a claim and the defendant's contact with the forum is not an ap•
propriate matter of concern in assessing the validity of an assertion of jurisdiction.
67. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
68. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
69. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967); Keckler v.
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tially, it is grounded on the concept that when a defendant
undertakes an act that is such that he should expect the courts of
another state to assert jurisdiction over him, such jurisdiction may
constitutionally be asserted. In Gray the defendant's contacts with
Illinois, the forum state, were slight. It manufactured a valve in
Ohio that was installed by another manufacturer in a water heater
in Pennsylvania, and the heater was then sold to the plaintiff in Illinois. The heater exploded in Illinois, allegedly as a result of a defect in the valve, and injured the plaintiff. The Illinois supreme
court held that Illinois could assert jurisdiction over the Ohio defendant because, "[a]s a general proposition, if a corporation elects
to sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust
to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those
products." 70 This emphasis on what the defendant should have expected goes beyond the scope of the "purposeful act" view taken by
the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla, and generally should produce desirable results. Putting an article into commerce is certainly
a purposeful act that results in some relationship between the manufacturer and the state in which that product is used. Concern for
the defendant's expectation ensures that fair play, the essence of jurisdictional due process, will not be ignored. It will usually be equitable to expect one who makes interstate sales of an article to be
prepared to defend wherever that article is used. 71
However, this approach is not necessarily applicable to every case
in which interstate commerce is involved. For example, in a recent
Michigan case, Dornbos v. Kroger,72 it was held that jurisdiction
could be asserted over an Indiana defendant who had transported
goods from Illinois to Tennessee on behalf of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff had his fish shipped from Michigan to Chicago, and the defendant then transported the fish to Tennessee. The defendant had
no agents, business, or property in Michigan; had not solicited business there; and was licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission
to enter only four states--none of which was Michigan.711 Under these
circumstances the defendant could in no way have been charged with
an expectation of having to defend against an action in Michigan.
The assertion of jurisdiction over this defendant represented a blind
extension-or more properly, a misinterpretation-of Gray that
Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. ID. 1965); Blount v. T.D. Publishing
Corp., 77 N.M. !184, 42ll P.2d 421 (1966). But cf. Tilley v. Keller Truck 8' Implement
Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968).
70. 22 ID. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d. at 766.
71. Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 Supp. 645, 649 (N.D. m. 1965).
72. 9 Mich. App. 515, 157 N.W.2d 498, leave to appeal denied, 381 Mich. 772 (1968),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Adkins Transfer Co., Inc. v. Dornbos, 393 U.S. ll22 (1969).
7ll. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 6·7, Adkins Transfer Co., Inc. v. Dornbos, !19ll U.S. ll22 (1969).
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went far beyond what fair play would have permitted, and that
therefore should not have been tolerated. 74 Thus, the Gray analysis
is an acceptable method of determining whether a court possesses
jurisdiction when it is used to gauge a defendant's expectations, but
not when it is applied as a blanket rule covering all interstate transactions.
The standards advanced have not been developed by the courts
alone. Professors von Mehren and Trautman have proposed a fourth
standard, which may be referred to as a geographical-extent analysis.75 This approach is based on the premise that the court system
currently favors defendants since the plaintiff who has a cause of
action against a foreign defendant normally must go to that defendant's home state in order to obtain a remedy. This preference is
appropriate in the usual case, because a court cannot enforce its
judgment unless it has jurisdiction over the defendant or his property.76 Bringing an action in the defendant's state also produces judicial efficiency because it eliminates the need for an additional
enforcement proceeding. However, under the analysis proposed by
Professors von Mehren and Trautman, this traditional preference
for the defendant would be reversed when the equities of a given
case indicate that the plaintiff should be favored. In deciding whether
the equities of a particular case require reversal of the usual preference, two factors should be determinative: (I) the defendant's expectations, and (2) the geographical extent of the respective activities of
each party. Thus, the plaintiff's state should be able to exercise jurisdiction in an action against a defendant who quite clearly should
have expected the exercise of jurisdiction by the plaintiff's state, or
in an action by a localized plaintiff against a multistate defendant. 77
The application of the expectation analysis was discussed above
in the context of the Gray case.78 The application of the second
factor advanced by these authors, that the geographical extent of
the parties' activities should be an essential jurisdictional criterion, is
illustrated by the circumstances typically surrounding an action
brought by an individual plaintiff against a defendant, such as an
insurance company, that is engaged in widespread multistate activities. It is suggested that the "extensive multistate activity" of such
a defendant, when contrasted with the typically localized economic
and legal existence of an individual plaintiff, should produce a
74. See Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (N.D. Ill.
1967), in which the court refused to hold that a bank should be subject to jurisdiction
wherever its checks are circulated.
75. von Mehren 8: Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
76. See text preceding note 8 supra.
77. von Mehren 8: Trautman, supra note 75, at 1167-69.
78. See notes 67-74 supra and accompanying text.
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preference for the assumption of jurisdiction by the plaintiff's home
state.79 The burden thus placed on the defendant by requiring it to
litigate in a foreign forum would not be considered to be an unfair incident of its widespread operations, while the localized plaintiff would be relieved of the burden of going to the defendant's
headquarters in another state to obtain recompense for injuries received at home.
Although this approach does not appear to have been explicitly
adopted by any courts to date, its general tenets have been followed
at least implicitly in Golden Belt Manufacturing Company v. ]anler
Plastic Mold Corporation,80 a contract case brought by a North Carolina corporation against an Illinois corporation in a federal district
court in North Carolina. The court determined that although jurisdiction might properly have been asserted if the plaintiff had been
an individual, it was not proper to assert jurisdiction when the plaintiff was a corporation since "[t]he hardship in conducting the suit in
a foreign forum is as great on one party as it is on the other."81 Thus,
while the court found no basis for disturbing the traditional preference for the defendant in this particular case, it displayed a willingness to look to the geographical extent of the activities of each party
and the resulting hardships imposed by requiring foreign litigation,
in determining the propriety of attaching jurisdiction.
This approach to the determination of the permissible limits of
jurisdiction stresses the relevance of convenience and mobility to the
concept of fair play. Certainly, these standards are justified by the
Supreme Court decisions, since one of the very reasons for the abandonment of the Pennoyer standards was that "progress in comunications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign
tribunal less burdensome." 82 However, this analysis has been accurately criticized as not going far enough in considering interests of
the parties other than the defendant's expectations and the geographic extent of the activities of both parties.83 Thus, complete reliance on this standard would not seem to be appropriate.
A fifth concept-related to the geographical-extent analysis, but
carrying its underlying rationale further-is based upon a complete
analysis of the interests of the parties and of the court in having a
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

von Mehren 8e Trautman, supra note 75, at 1168.
281 F. Supp. 368 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
281 F. Supp. at 371.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
Carrington &: Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts,
66 MICH. L. REv. 227, 245-46 (1967). Cf. Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Con•
venience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 8889 n.47 (1968), suggesting that the relative extent of the parties' multistate activities is
not an appropriate test for determining amenability, but that such considerations are
more properly handled by use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, stays of further
proceedings, and venue transfers.
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given case decided within a given state.84 In its most sophisticated
form, this approach asserts that a court should attempt to balance all
of the interests involved in a case rather than concentrating solely on
whether there are sufficient contacts between the forum and the controversy. The required quantum of contacts should then vary proportionately with the benefits and inversely with the costs involved
in the exercise of jurisdictional power in a given case. 85 An example
of this type of approach can be found in Curtis Publishing Company
v. Birdsong.86 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that even though the defendant's contacts with the forum state
might have been jurisdictionally sufficient in an isolated sense, they
should not have been considered sufficient when both parties were
nonresidents of the forum state and when the events giving rise to
the cause of action were not peculiar to that state.87 The plaintiff in
Birdsong was a Mississippi highway patrolman, the defendant was a
Pennsylvania corporation, and the libel action was brought in Alabama. To have sustained the Alabama court's jurisdiction would
have required the conclusion that jurisdiction could be sustained in
any state in the Union, a conclusion that would clearly encourage
the distasteful practice of forum shopping. The court of appeals thus
held that this detrimental aspect overrode the technical propriety of
asserting jurisdiction.
Proponents of this standard would also consider the nature of the
harm involved to be relevant, both in the sense of the nature of the
injury complained of by the plaintiff and in the sense of the danger
of harm involved in subjecting a particular defendant to the jurisdiction of a distant forum. They suggest that the exercise of longarm jurisdiction is more appropriate when the plaintiff has suffered
bodily harm than when the injury is economic.88 Similarly, they
would agree with the determination of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in New York Times Company v. Connor8 9 that "First
Amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel require a
greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process clause than is
necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of tortious activ-

ity. "DO
In evaluating the various approaches to the formulation of a
84. See Deuelopments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 7!l HARV. L. R.Ev. 909,
923-48 (1960).
85. Carrington &: Martin, supra note 83, at 230.
86. 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966).
87. See also- Ventling v. Kraft, 83 S.D. 465, 477, 161 N.W.2d 29, 35 (1968) ijudge
Biegelmeier, concurring): "Because jurisdiction of one transaction may be asserted by
several states, courts must exercise caution in applying this expanded doctrine."
88. Carrington & Martin, supra note 83, at 232.
89. 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
90. 385 F.2d at 572. See also Note, First Amendment's Role in Determining Place
of Trial in Libel Actions, 66 Mica. L. R.Ev. 542, 550-52 (1968), approving of this deci•
sion.
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more definite standard to determine borderline cases, it appears that
the first two standards examined above serve little purpose. The numerical-contacts test provides at best a superficial analysis and results
in a meaningless battle of numbers. The second, which indiscriminately applies three factors deemed to be essential or critical in various Supreme Court decisions, is unnecessarily restrictive. The other
standards that have been developed are all useful but to some extent
conflict with one another. The expectation analysis of Gray does not
necessarily bear any relation to the relative interests of the parties,
and it does not in itself indicate any distinction in the quantum of
contacts required for different kinds of injury, although some recent
interpretations have superimposed such considerations.91 A substantial conflict exists between the interest analysis and the geographicalextent analysis. The latter approach suggests that jurisdiction should
be asserted in cases such as Connor and even Birdsong in which a
defendant has engaged in wide multistate activities, while the former
-which takes into account the relative interests of the parties, including first amendment considerations--clearly rejects the assertion
of jurisdiction in both of those cases.92 Although the interest analysis,
unlike the geographical-extent or expectation analyses, appears to
take all relevant factors into consideration, the nature of its balancing approach greatly hinders predictability. Thus, even though each
of the five analyses seems to recognize and take proper account of factors relevant to the determination of jurisdictional limits, the facts
that each contains certain inherent limitations on its usefulness, and
that there exists a certain degree of conflict among them, combine to
preclude their use as definitive standards.
Moreover, since the various analyses do conflict somewhat, and
since their application may require a relatively high degree of sophistication, concern with these analyses has led some courts to overlook relatively obvious considerations. It is necessary to recall that
the fundamental standard behind the exercise of jurisdiction is still
fair play under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Confusion resulting from concern with highly sophisticated analyses
should not, but may, lead to obfuscation of this basic point. The
jurisdictional issue is a preliminary one and should be determined
with a minimum of complex analysis. Although cases will arise that
require extensive analysis and a precise determination of jurisdictional limits-such as those involving first amendment freedoms or
a minimum of contacts--confusion surrounding the permissible
limits of jurisdiction should not, in the usual case, be allowed to
result in a blindness toward the fundamental considerations of fair91. Compare, e.g., Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill.
1965), indicating approval of the expectation analysis in a case involving personal in•
jury, with Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (N.D. Ill.
1967), rejecting such an approach in a case involving economic injury.
92. Carrington &: Martin, supra note 83, at 245-46.
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ness. When such blindness does occur, there will be needless delay
and litigation. The fair-play standard itself indicates that the issue of
jurisdiction should be resolved quickly when possible, because it is
not fair play for the plaintiff to be subjected to the expense of delay
unless a legitimate purpose is served. Furthermore, no interest of the
courts, nor any defensible interest of the defendant, is served by
extensive litigation over jurisdiction. In the unusual case, such as
Birdsong or Connor, extensive jurisdictional litigation may be unavoidable.93 Considerations relevant to those cases, however, should
not be allowed to obscure vision in the ordinary case.
II.

APPLICATIONS OF THE MODERN DOCTRINE

Attempts at highly sophisticated jurisdictional analysis have
caused courts in recent years to reach erroneous results in three
groups of cases that would have been capable of easy analysis in
terms of fair play. Each of these groups will be examined as illustrative of the generally unsatisfactory decisions that have been reached
when courts have become caught in their own jurisdictional fog.
A. Lesser Included Claims
One group of cases in which excessive concern with the hard case
-one that approaches the extreme limits of jurisdiction-seems
to have led to unwarranted difficulty in deciding the easy case-one
that falls well within the permissible limits of jurisdiction-involves what may be referred to as lesser included claims. When a
court has jurisdiction over a defendant with regard to one of the
plaintiff's claims, and the plaintiff has other claims that may be properly joined94 and that will not impose any additional burden on the
defense, there should be no concern with whether jurisdiction may
constitutionally be asserted over these lesser included claims. Jurisdiction should be asserted with reference to the particular fact situation, not with reference to the plaintiff's claims considered in
isolation.
This problem is well illustrated by Fayette v. Volkswagen of
America, Incorporated,95 a case in which the plaintiff alleged that he
had suffered injuries as a result of a defective seat in an automobile
that he had purchased. The action was brought in Tennessee, although the car had been purchased elsewhere. The court held that
93. See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 883 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967). The court
in that case determined that while a newspaper is primarily local and should not be
subjected to jurisdiction in a distant forum in a libel action because of the danger to
freedom of the press, a national magazine is not primarily a local concern and should
therefore be prepared to defend wherever it is circulated. 383 F .2d at 590, 594.
94. Generally, claims are properly joined when there is a "sufficient legal similarity"
between them. F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.2, at 446-49 (1965). For the rules relating to joinder in the federal courts, see FED. R. Crv. P. 18.
95. 273 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Tenn. 1967).
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it possessed jurisdiction over the claims of misrepresentation, breach
of warranty with privity, and breach of warranty without privity.96
However, the court also held that it could not assert jurisdiction
over the claim arising from the sale of a defective chattel since the
sale had not taken place in Tennessee; 97 nor would it accept jurisdiction over the claim of negligent manufacture since the car was
not manufactured within the state.98 This division of claims, and the
consequent assertion of jurisdiction only over some of them, appears
to have been inappropriate, because the facts at issue in defending
against the misrepresentation and breach-of-warranty charges were
likely to have included all of those at issue in defending against the
sale-of-a-defective-chattel charge.99 The claim for negligent manufacture, however, may have involved different factual proofs; if so,
the court properly denied jurisdiction over that claim. But since the
court failed to consider whether such additional proof was involved,
its conclusion that jurisdiction could not be asserted appears to have
been reached by an unsound approach. For so long as the same factual issues are involved in deciding both claims-so that no additional factual burden is placed on the defendant-a court that has
asserted jurisdiction over the primary claim has no compelling
reason to refuse to assert jurisdiction over the lesser included claim.
The considerations that lead to this conclusion are similar to
those that have given rise to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in
the federal courts. Under that doctrine, a federal court may assert
jurisdiction over a nonfederal claim whenever "[t]he state and federal
claims ... derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." 100 This
doctrine is calculated to promote judicial efficiency;101 similarly, the
efficient dispensation of justice would be greatly enhanced by the
assertion of jurisdiction over lesser included claims. But this interest
in efficiency is not the only factor supporting this result; the basic
doctrine of fair play also demands it. It is hardly unfair to require a
defendant to respond to all of a plaintiff's claims when the burden
of his defense is not thereby increased. On the other hand, it clearly
would be unreasonable and unnecessary to require a plaintiff who
has fully litigated a claim in one forum to relitigate in another forum-and thus double his expense in terms of time and money-a
96. 273 F. Supp. at 329.
97. 273 F. Supp. at 329.
98. 273 F. Supp. at 327-28.
99. The question whether additional proof would be required for the additional
claims was not discussed in the opinion. It would seem that a sale would have to be
proven before any warranty could be found, and that the defectiveness of the chattel
would probably have to be proven before a breach of warranty or a misrepresentation
could be established.
100. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS 62-65 (2d ed. 1970).
101. Id. at 64.
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lesser claim that arose from the same factual transaction as did the
first claim.
Usually, jurisdiction should be asserted only over those claims
that are truly lesser and truly included.102 However, the existence of
jurisdiction over the defendant with regard to one claim is also relevant to the question of the extent to which jurisdiction may be asserted over other claims that cannot be classified as lesser included.
The interest of a court in taking a whole case and the interest of the
plaintiff in having all of his claims adjudicated in one proceeding
suggest that if a defendant must appear to defend one claim, the
quantum of contacts required to assert jurisdiction over other nonincluded claims should be less than would otherwise be the case. 103
For example, assume that in Fayette the defense to the charge of negligent manufacture would have required no more than a demonstration of the manner in which seats were installed in the defendant's
automobiles. While it might have been unfair to require that the
defendant come to Tennessee to defend against this claim alone, it
might not have been unfair to impose this additional burden on him
when he was already in the state defending against the other claims.
This conclusion is strengthened if it appears that the plaintiff would
otherwise have to travel to the defendant's principal place of business and initiate additional proceedings in order to obtain complete
vindication of his rights. Thus, the fairness of adding to the burden
of the defense must be compared with the fairness of requiring the
plaintiff to bring another action elsewhere; the jurisdictional question is not one which can be answered by an isolated examination
of each claim.
Determining the validity of asserting jurisdiction over lesser included claims requires little analytical effort. Similarly, consideration
of the propriety of asserting jurisdiction over other related claims
does not require extensive analysis by the court. The facts necessary
for these appraisals should appear in the pleadings, and, when necessary, interrogatories could be utilized.104 Certainly the analysis that
these considerations would require is less extensive than that which
must be made if each claim is considered in isolation. By focusing
on the total fact situation involved, rather than on individual claims,
the analysis is simplified and the underlying objective of guaranteeing fundamental fairness is accomplished. In this manner, judicial
efficiency is furthered and the relative interests of the parties are
recognized.
102. Lesser included claims include those that may be properly joined and that impose no additional burden on the defense. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
103. It may be argued that the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant
with respect to the first claim is itself a significant contact that may be counted.
104. See Fraley v. Chesapeake&: Ohio Ry. Co., 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968).
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B. Contract Claims
The choice of law applicable to an interstate-contract dispute
generally will depend on such considerations as the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and the domiciles or
places of business of the parties involved. 105 Such considerations also
may be relevant to the assertion of jurisdiction over an interstatecontract dispute. However, the jurisdictional question should generally be independent of the choice-of-law question. Fairness to the
defendant does not require that the forum that asserts jurisdiction
apply its own law.108
Nonetheless, a number of courts have applied these choice-of-law
considerations to the jurisdictional determination,107 possibly because they are looking for factors that provide a definite standard by
which to judge jurisdiction, or possibly because they have confused
the two issues and thereby unwittingly transferred the choice-of-law
approach to the jurisdictional question. Whatever the reason, such
an approach to jurisdictional determinations is undesirable. Blind
adherence to choice-of-law principles results in a failure to give
proper consideration to what should be the crucial factor in resolving any jurisdictional issue-the fundamental matter of fair play.
Crescent Corporation v. Martin108 provides a good illustration.
In that case the plaintiff, an Oklahoma resident, entered into an
employment contract with the defendant, a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in New York. The plaintiff was
to serve as a consultant to the defendant by attending and reporting
at two meetings of defendant's board of directors a year. Although
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that jurisdiction could not
be asserted over the defendant in Oklahoma, it indicated that a contrary result might be reached if the plaintiff could amend his pleadings to show either that the contract had been made or accepted in
Oklahoma, or was to be performed there.109 It is difficult to understand why, in this and similar cases,11° a factor such as the place of accepting the contract should be determinative of jurisdiction.
105. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (Proposed Official Draft,
pt. 2, 1968). To some extent these considerations are also relevant to the evaluation of
the interests of the parties to an action on a contract. See Developments in the LawState-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 84, at 926-28.
106. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). It is, however, unlikely that an ac-·
tion would be brought in a forum without at least some choice-of-law considerations
indicating that the law of that forum should apply.
107. See note llO infra. See also Golden Belt Mfg. Co. v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp.,
281 F. Supp. 368, 371 (M.D.N.C. 1967), afjd., 391 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1968).
108. 443 P.2d Ill (Okla. 1968).
109. 443 P.2d at ll7.
HO. See, e.g., National Television Sales, Inc. v. Philadelphia Television Broadcasting
Co., 284 F. Supp. 68. (N.D. lll. 1968); Wirth v. Prenyl, S.A., 29 App. Div. 2d 373, 288
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A more appropriate analysis, and one considerably less complex,
would result from the application of the Gray expectation analysis.111
Under that approach jurisdiction may be asserted by the state of
residence of either party to an interstate contract.112 If an interstate
contract is regarded as one involving interstate negotiations, or the
anticipation of performance in a state other than that in which all
the negotiations take place, it is not unreasonable to assume that one
who signs such a contract expects or should expect to have to defend
in the state of residence of the other party to the contract.113 More
specifically, an employer who hires an Oklahoma resident should not
be surprised if it becomes subject to a suit by that employee in an
Oklahoma court.
The application of the expectation analysis is peculiarly appropriate to contract, as opposed to tort, cases. For while there is some
element of fiction in the general idea that one who puts an article
into the stream of commerce should expect to have to defend wherever that article is withdrawn from the stream,114 there is no such
fiction in applying the expectation concept to a contract case in
which the potential litigational forums are readily ascertainable at
the time of making the contract. If either party finds the possibility
of having to defend in another party's home forum particularly
onerous, he is in a position to protect against this contingency by
stipulations in the contract. If the forum of each party's residence
is generally appropriate, there is no reason to invalidate a prior
selection of one,115 and the courts appear willing to accept such a
selection. For example, in National Equipment Rental, Limited v.
Szukhent,116 the Supreme Court enforced a stipulation in a leasing
contract that had the effect of placing exclusive jurisdiction over
disputes arising under the contract in the courts of the lessor's home
state.117 An exception to such a rule might be appropriate in the
case of contracts of adhesion,118 although the courts have traditionally
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1968); Hubbard, Westervelt 8: Mottelay, Inc. v. Harsh Bldg. Co., 28 App.
Div. 2d 295, 284 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1967).
111. See notes 67-74 supra and accompanying text.
112. However, Gray should not be applied in every case in which intcnitate commerce is involved. See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
113. The Texas long-arm statute applies a test that appears to incorporate these
considerations. TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031B, § 4 (1964). See notes 123-24 infra
and accompanying text.
114. See Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 649 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
115. But see von Mehren 8: Trautman, supra note 75, at 1138-39.
116. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
117. See also Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 367 F~d 341 (3d Cir.
1966); R. CRAMTON 8: D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAws 468, 512-13 (1968). But see Indussa
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
118. A contract of adhesion typically is the result of a disparity in the relative bargaining power of the parties to a contract, allowing the stronger party to impose his
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validated such contracts, at least those negotiated at arm's length.119
At any event, concern with the adhesion contract should not prevent
acceptance of the general proposition that parties may stipulate the
forum of their choice.
Seilon, Incorporated v. Brema S.p.A.,12° decided by a federal district court sitting in Ohio, is typical of the cases that have refused
to give effect to the parties' jurisdictional stipulations. Plaintiff, a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio,
entered into a contract with defendant, an Italian individual. The
defendant then incorporated his business in Italy, and the old contract was replaced with a new one. The court was unable to determine whether the new contract had been accepted in Ohio or in
Italy. Under the contract, the plaintiff was to design a factory to be
built in Italy, and was to train some of the defendant's employees.
The parties stipulated that Italian courts were to have jurisdiction
over any disagreements that arose under the contract. After the
defendant allegedly breached the contract, the plaintiff brought an
action against him in Ohio. Without specifying any apparent basis
for its decision,121 the court held that the stipulation was ineffective
and that jurisdiction could be exercised in the Ohio forum. This
terms and conditions on the weaker party. This result is generally achieved by the use
of form contracts. In essence, if the weaker party wants the goods or services offered, he
must adhere to the terms of the form contract. G. GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF CoNTRACTS § 294, at 507 (rev. ed. 1965).
The New York courts have refused to enforce a clause that stipulates jurisdiction
when the facts surrounding the contract render that clause unconscionable within the
meaning of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. In Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 56
Misc. 2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (App. Div.), affd., 295 N.Y.S.2d 606 (App. Div. 1968)
(mem.), it was held that a New York court should refuse jurisdiction over a form sales
contract between a Massachusetts merchant and a Massachusetts consumer, despite a
clause stipulating that New York courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
arising from the contract. The court emphasized the parties' unequal bargaining positions.
119. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1376 (1962). Szukhent involved a contract in which
farm equipment was leased to a farmer. In his dissent, Justice Black emphasized the
unfairness arising from the consumer's lack of bargaining power with regard to the
standardized form clause. 375 U.S. at 326. The failure of the Court to adopt this view
suggests that the enforcement of jurisdictional stipulation clauses in adhesion contracts
does not involve due process problems. But cf. Sun-X Intl. Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
120. 271 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
121. The court gave no reasons and cited only Alcaro v. Jean Jordeau, Inc., 138 F.2d
767 (3d Cir. 1943), a case which bears no relation to the question whether a stipulation
such as the one before the court in Seilon is effective. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON•
FLICT OF LAws § 80 (Proposed Official Draft, pt. 2, 1967) indicates that the Seilon court
was in error. This conclusion would appear to be especially true since the court was
sitting in Ohio, which is one of the three states in the nation which recognizes cognovit clauses in contracts (the other two are Illinois and Pennsylvania). Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29
U. CHI. L. REv. 111, 131 (1961). If a court is willing to recognize a cognovit clause, by
which a judgment against a party is confessed in the contract, it should surely be willing to recognize a jurisdictional stipulation.
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decision does not comport with considerations of fair play. There
was no indication in the opinion that the contract was in any manner adhesive; indeed, if either party held the upper hand in the
negotiations, it would appear to have been the plaintiff. Once the
plaintiff corporation willingly bargained away any right it might
have had to an Ohio forum, it was neither fair to the defendant,
nor did it correspond with defendant's expectations, to void that
stipulation in the contract.
Although never desirable, a poorly decided opinion normally
must be tolerated as an inevitable result of human error. However,
when the Seilon court unjustifiably refused to recognize a jurisdictional stipulation in the contract, more than the interests of the
actual parties involved were adversely affected. The decision in
Seilon also struck at the premise that jurisdiction should be recognized in the state of residence of either party; thus, that decision
may lead to a hesitancy on the part of courts to assert jurisdiction
solely on the basis that one of the parties to an interstate contract
resides in the forum state. The legitimacy of asserting jurisdiction
under such circumstances depends upon the willingness of courts
to enforce stipulations when they do appear. A party cannot logically be held subject to jurisdiction in one state on the ground
that he did not stipulate otherwise unless a stipulation, when made,
is given effect. However, it would be inappropriate to disregard the
general proposition that a court may properly assert jurisdiction
over a claim arising from an interstate contract when one of the
parties is a resident of the forum state, merely because a rare courtsuch as the Seilon court-erroneously refuses to give effect to a jurisdictional-stipulation clause. As the Szukhent case demonstrates, such
clauses should normally be enforced. 122 Therefore, since a party to an
interstate contract does have a means of protecting himself from being subjected to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, it would be fair
play to permit the assertion of jurisdiction by a court of a state in
which either party resides.
The Texas long-arm statute has adopted the concept that jurisdiction may be asserted by the state of residence of either party to
a contract. In essence, that statute provides that the act of entering
into an interstate contract with a Texas resident will constitute a
sufficient basis for the assertion of jurisdiction by the Texas courts. 123
Although at least two non-Texas courts have found that provision
unconstitutional,124 consideration of the defendant's expectations
122. See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra.
123. The statute provides that an individual or corporation "shall be deemed doing
business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of
Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State ••• .'' TEX.
REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031B, § 4 (1964).
124. Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex.
1960), revd. on other grounds, 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961); Moore v. Evans, 196 S.2d 839
(La. Ct. App. 1967).

December 1970]

Comments

325

indicates that those cases were wrongly decided. There is adequate
case support to uphold the residency analysis suggested above. Language in McGee v. International Life Insurance Company suggests
that the mere existence of a contract to which a resident of the
forum state is a party provides a sufficient basis for the assertion
of jurisdiction.125 Since a number of courts have upheld jurisdiction
in cases involving similarly minimal contact between the defendant
and the forum state,126 it would appear that the plaintiff's residency
in the forum state provides a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction
adequate to withstand constitutional objection.
Thus, it does not seem inappropriate to require that a party
defend an action in the home forum of one with whom he has
entered into an interstate contract. The courts of each state may
be presumed to have an interest in protecting the interests of its
residents, and the court system as a whole has an interest in the
efficient dispensation of justice. Both of these interests are served
by the rapid determination of the jurisdictional issue through reference to the contract itself. Should a party find the possibility of
having to defend in a foreign forum onerous, he may protect himself by stipulation. When such stipulations are made-unless the
provision is adhesive-it usually will not be fair play to subject a
party to the jurisdiction of a forum that was not stipulated, because
that party has every reason to expect that such jurisdiction will not
be asserted, and his adversary has voluntarily encouraged this belief.
Thus, by recognizing jurisdiction over interstate-contract disputes
in the state of residence of either party-except when the parties
voluntarily exclude either or both forums-the parties' expectations
are effectuated, the jurisdictional matter is efficiently decided, and
compliance with the standard of fair play is assured.

C. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
Commentators as well as courts have been plagued by the jurisdictional mystique. The recent controversy among courts and commentators over the exercise by New York courts of quasi in rem
jurisdiction on the basis of insurance policies covering automobile
accident liability provides another illustration of the general tendency to approach jurisdictional issues with overly complex analyses.
The controversy originated with the case of Seider v. Roth,127
125. "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial contacts with that state." 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
126. See, e.g., Midwest Packaging Corp. v. Oerlikon Plastics, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 816
(S.D. Iowa 1968); Coletti v. Ovaltine Food Products, 274 F. Supp. 719 (D.P.R. 1967); Aucoin v. Hanson, 207 S.2d 834 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Ventling v. Kraft, 83 S.D. 465, 161
N.W.2d 29 (1968); Griffiths &: Sprague Stevedoring Co. v. Bayly, Martin &: Fay, Inc., 71
Wash. 2d 679, 430 P .2d 600 (1967).
127. 17 N.Y.2d lll, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). No other state has
adopted this approach to quasi in rem jurisdiction.
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which involved a Vermont automobile accident between a New
York plaintiff and a Canadian defendant. The defendant's insurer
was a Connecticut corporation that did business in New York. The
New York Court of Appeals held that the New York courts could
attach the policy as a debt owed to the defendant,128 and thereby acquire quasi in rem jurisdiction.129 This case and those that have
followed it have been soundly condemned by the commentators.180
However, those criticisms have not dealt with or resolved the fundamental problems inherent in the Seider doctrine.
The basic flaw in the Seider analysis involves the failure of the
New York courts and federal courts in the Second Circuit to recognize fully that the limitations on quasi in rem jurisdiction are-or at
least should be-identical to those on long-arm in personam jurisdiction.131 While the commentators generally have indicated a recognition of this problem,132 most have failed to give it sufficient emphasis.133 Rather, the criticisms of the doctrine have centered on such
limited issues as whether due process is violated when a limited appearance is not made available to an insured whose policy has been
attached; 134 whether the Seider doctrine, construed as a judicially
created direct-action statute, is constitutional; 135 and whether it is appropriate for such a statute to be judicially created.186 The courts
128. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), in which the Supreme Court held that
garnishment proceedings could be instituted wherever the garnishee could be served
with process.
129. See note 2 supra.
130. See, e.g., Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1075 (1968); Comment, Podolsky v. Devinney and the Garnishment of Intangi•
bles: A Chip off the Old Balk, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426 (1968); Comment, Garnishment of
Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLUM. L. REv.
550 (1967); Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1180
(1968); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L.
REv. 654 (1967).
131. See notes 174-200 infra and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Comment, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 550, supra note 130, at 559; Note, 53
CORNELL L. REv. 1108, supra note 130, at 1116-18; Note, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654, supra
note 120, at 654-55.
133. One article, Comment, Jurisdiction in Rem and the Attachment of Intangibles:
Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, did assert that the major difficulty
with the Seider doctrine is the unjustifiable dichotomy between the Pennoyer principles apparently applicable to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction and the International Shoe principles applicable to in personam jurisdiction. See also Note,
Jurisdiction in New York: A Proposed Reform, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 1412 (1969), pro·
posing that New York abolish quasi in rem jurisdiction concomitantly with an expansion of the permissible bases for attaching in personam jurisdiction.
134. See Comment, 54 V.A. L. REv. 1426, supra note 130, at 1434-38.
135. See Comment, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 550, supra note 130, at 559; Note, 19 STAN. L.
REv. 654, supra note 130, at 654-55. A direct-action statute is one that permits an injured party to sue the insurer of the wrongdoer directly without first establishing the
liability of the insured. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1959).
136. See Note, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1108, supra note 130, at 1118-21.
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have met the thrust of these criticisms, holding that a limited appearance is available,137 that the Seider doctrine is the equivalent of a direct-action statute,138 and that as such it is constitutional.139 But
although the arguments that have been raised against the doctrine
have largely been met, the fundamental flaw remains uncorrected.
A close reading of the Seider case indicates that the debt that was
found to be attachable was the insurer's obligation to defend the
insured rather than the obligation to indemnify him.140 The difficulty with attaching the insurer's obligation to indemnify is clear;
the obligation does not arise until after jurisdiction has been asserted
and a judgment has been rendered.141 To attach this obligation as a
basis for jurisdiction therefore involves an indefensible bootstrap
argument.H 2 Attachment of the obligation to defend, on the other
hand, easily may be justified because the insurer's obligation arises
as soon as the complaint is filed, even if the defense consists merely
of a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.143 But attachment of
this obligation meets with a practical difficulty. Should the defendant fail to appear, and thereby have a default judgment rendered
137. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
See notes 160-64 infra and accompanying text.
1!18. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410
F.2d II7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
139. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
140. 17 N.Y.2d at ll3-I4, 216 N.E.2d at 314-15, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02. The court
indicated that the insurance policy "requires Hartford, among other things, to defend
••• in any automobile negiligence action and, if judgment be rendered ••• to indemnify • • • • Thus as soon as the accident occurred there was imposed on Hartford a
contractual obligation which should be considered a 'debt ••• .'" 17 N.Y.2d at II3, 216
N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at IOI. This language indicates that the obligation arising
immediately is that of defense. Furthermore, the court relied exculsively on In re Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962), and referred to that case as
involving " 'the personal obligation of an indemnity insurance carrier to defend ... .' "
17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102. Since the Seider court made
no reference to any indemnification obligation in Riggle, and concluded that "the law
question in this case [has] been decided by Riggle," 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315,
269 N.Y.S.2d at 102, the basis for the attachment must have been the obligation to defend. Nonetheless, most commentators appear to believe that the Seider court upheld
attachment of the obligation to indemnify as well as the obligation to defend. See Stein,
supra note 130, at 1079; Comment, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725, supra note 133, at 745; Note,
53 CORNELL L. REv. ll08, supra note 130, at 1108; Note, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654, supra
note 130, at 654. But see Comment, 67 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 550, supra note 130, at 552.
141. However, it has been suggested that there is New York precedent for the view
that the right to indemnification vests upon the occurrence of an accident subject to
divestment in the event that the insured is not found liable. Comment, 1968 DUKE
L.J. 725, supra note 133, at 745 n.83. The court in Seider placed no reliance on any
such precedent.
142. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d Ill, II5, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99,
103 (1966) ijudge Burke, dissenting); Comment, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550, supra note 130
at 555; Comment, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426, supra note 130, at 1431-32.
143. But see Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Seider
v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d Ill, ll5, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (1966) ijudge
Burke, dissenting), both of which assert that even the obligation to defend cannot arise
until jurisdiction has been validily obtained.
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against him, it is virtually impossible to determine the value of the
res from which the plaintiff is entitled to collect his judgment.144 If
the defendant does appear, it was thought until recently that he
would be subject to in personam jurisdiction.145 However, the New
York Court of Appeals has held, in Simpson v. Loehman,146 that an
appearance to defend on the merits does not subject the defendant
to liability in excess of the attached debt. Therefore, a proper application of Seider would limit the recovery to the insurer's obligation
to defend, which would have little value once the case has been
argued. 147
Perhaps in recognition of this problem, some New York courts,
after originally basing these quasi in rem proceedings on the existence of the obligation to defend, have now eliminated reference to
this obligation to defend when describing the attached debt. 148 In
Simpson v. Loehman149 three separate opinions were written by
members of the "majority." Chief Judge Fuld referred to the "insurer's obligation" without specifying whether that involved the
obligation to defend or to indemnify. 160 Judge Keating recognized
the Seider doctrine as a judicially created direct-action statute that
enabled the plaintiff to sue the insurance company directly. 151 Judge
144. When personal jurisdiction over the defendant has not been obtained, recovery
under a judgment quasi in rem is limited to the property-or res-attached and cannot
be satisfied out of any other property. F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.7, at 6!1
(1965). Note, however, that a valuation of the attached res may be forced in New York
by a motion to replace the attached property with a bond of equal value. N. Y. CIV.
PRAc. LAw § 6222 (McKinney 1966). See Note, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1108, supra note 130,
at 1111.
But cf. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1071, at 277
(1969), in which it is stated that "the size of the debt in the auto insurance situation
depends entirely upon the results of the litigation itself.••• [B]y appearing defendant
well may be able to hold the liability down." These authors apparently assume that the
value of the attached res is equal to the amount of the judgment.
145. See, e.g., Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). New York
does not generally recognize a special appearance. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 320 (McKin•
ney Supp. 1968).
146. 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y .S.2d 914 (1968). See text accompanying
notes 160-64 infra. But see Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1968),
rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969), for the suggestion that the New York judgment could subject a defendant to liability in excess of
the attached debt in a second forum that might deem the New York judgment effective
as a collateral estoppel on the merits but not on the amount of recovery. In noting that
such a result could be reached by some state court, Judge Friendly, writing for the ma•
jority, stated that "we think it clear that neither New York nor any other state could
constitutionally give collateral estoppel effect to a Seider judgment ••••" 410 F.2d at
112.
147. See concurring opinion of Judge Breitel, Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305,
315,234 N.E.2d 669,674, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 641 (1967), as discussed in note 152 infra.
148. See note 154 infra.
149. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), motion for reargument
denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (per curiam).
150. 21 N.Y.2d at 307-12, 234 N.E.2d at 670-73, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 634-38.
151. 21 N.Y.2d at 312-14, 234 N.E.2d at 673-74, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 638-40 Gudge
Keating, concurring).
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Breitel, concurring only because he felt it inappropriate to overturn
Seider without a more persuasive basis that a change in the court's
personnel, referred to the "contingent liability to defend and indemnify."152
Seider and Simpson are the only two decisions by the New York
Court of Appeals dealing with the attachment of insurance policy
obligations.153 The lower New York courts and the federal courts
have consistently referred to Seider attachments in general terms
without specifying whether the obligation to defend or to indemnify
was involved. 154 It has, however, become clear that the courts regard
the obligation to indemnify as at least a part of the attached debt,155
152. 21 N.Y.2d at 314,234 N.E.2d at 674,287 N.Y.S.2d at 641 CTudge Breitel, concurring).
Judge Breitel also commented that "if the insurer's obligation to defend is fully performed, there is nothing of economic value to which the insured may make claim, receive or assign. As to the obligation to indemnify, that does not ripen until accident,
defense, and defeat resulting in judgment against the insured." 21 N.Y .2d at 315, 234
N.E.2d at 674-75, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641. This statement implies, perhaps, a theory that
the obligation to defend is initially attached, that as the trial continues the value of the
obligation diminishes, and that at the moment when the trial ends the obligation to
defend loses all value and is replaced by the obligation to indemnify-assuming there
is a decision for the plaintiff. Although interesting, such a theory is not satisfactory.
Since the case relates only to the plaintiff's claim on the obligation to defend, the indemnification obligation could not be attached without another attachment proceeding.
The litigated action, which concerned only the defense obligation, would provide no
basis for the attachment of the larger obligation to indemnify.
153. Simpson came before the New York Court of Appeals twice, the second time
on a motion for reargument. Simpson v. Loehman, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
154. The courts have referred to the attached res as the "insurer's obligations to
defend and indemnify," Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir.
1969): "defendant's interests in liability insurance policies," Minichiello v. Rosenberg,
410 F.2d 106, 107 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969); the "obligation ••• to defend the suit and indemnify," Jarvik v.
Magic Mountain Corp., 290 F. Supp. 998, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); the "obligation to defend
and indemnify," Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 316, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (1968);
the "obligation ••• to indemnify," Powsner v. Mills, 56 Misc. 2d 411, 288 N.Y.S.2d 846,
847 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1968); the "obligation to defend and indemnify," Brun v.
George W. Brown, Inc., 56 Misc. 2d 577,579,289 N.Y.S.2d 722,724 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Tenn
1968); "a contract of insurance," Alex v. Grande, 56 Misc. 2d, 931, 932, 290 N.Y.S.2d
303, 304 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Tenn 1968). None of these cases contain any further discussion
of the attached res. Only two other reported cases have dealt with the Seider doctrine
In Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court found the doctrine unconstitutional (see text accompanying notes 156-58 infra) and discussed the attached res, but indicated difficulty in determining which obligation was sought to be
attached. 281 F. Supp. at 494-97, 499. In Lefcourt v. Seacrest Hotel &: Motor Inn, 54
Misc. 2d 376,383,282 N.Y.S.2d 896,904 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1967), the court's language
was more explicit, but no more enlightening, than the language in other cases involving
the Seider doctrine: "[T]he 'debt' seized includes the carrier's obligation to investigate,
to defend and to indemnify." See also Cenkner v. Shafer, 61 Misc. 2d 807, 306 N.Y.S.2d
634 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1970), in which the judge expressed some confusion in de•
termining what res should be attached.
155. In Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914
(1968), the New York Court of Appeals, in denying a motion for reargument, held that
an appearance to defend on the merits would not subject the nomesident defendant to
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although the propriety of such an attachment has never been directly
confronted.
In Podolsky v. Devinney,156 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, with considerable support from
the commentators,157 declared the Seider doctrine unconstitutional,
largely because the defendant was not allowed to make a special appearance with liability limited to the amount of the attached obligation.158 Shortly after the Podolsky decision, a lower New York court
specifically held that a Seider defendant could not make a limited
appearance and rejected the Podolsky finding of unconstitutionality.159 The New York Court of Appeals then handed down the second
Simpson decision,160 which created a right to a limited appearance to
complement its judicially created direct-action statute.161 Shortly
after this change in the doctrine, a New York federal district court
held that the constitutional infirmity had been cured.162 More recently, the doctrine has been recognized by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit as a judicially created direct-action statute163
that complies with constitutional requirements.164
liability in excess of the face value of the attached policy. Unless the attached "debt"
is the obligation to indemnify, there is no basis for the choice of this amount as the
limit on liability.
156. 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
157. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 130; Comment, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550, supra note
130; Comment, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725, supra note 133; Comment, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426,
supra note 130; Note, 53 CORNELL L. REv. HOS, supra note 130; Note, 19 STAN. L. REv.
654, supra note 130.
158. The court specifically reserved decision on whether the Seider doctrine would
be constitutional if a limited appearance were available to a defendant. 281 F. Supp. at
498 n.26.
159. Alex v. Grande, 56 Misc. 2d 931, 290 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1968).
The date of the decision indicates that, in fact, the decision on the reargument of
Simpson (see note 155 supra) was handed down before this case was decided. However,
the court in Alex gave no indication that it was aware of the second Simpson decision.
160. See note 153 supra.
161. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
The court indicated that a limited appearance had always been available in such cases.
If this was true-and neither Seider nor the first Simpson decision indicated that it was
-the cases and commentators had universally failed to so recognize. See cases cited in
note 154 and commentaries cited in note 157 supra. See also Varady v. Margolis, 303 F.
Supp. 23, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), referring to the "miraculous" opinion denying reargument
in Simpson.
162. Jarvik v. Magic Mountain ~orp., 290 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
163. See note 135 supra.
164. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410
F.2d ll7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Some commentators have argued
that a direct-action statute must be limited to accidents occurring within the state in
order to be constitutional. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 130, at U00-04; Note, 19 STAN. L.
REv. 654, supra note 130, at 655. This matter is unclear, because the only reported decisions construing such statutes involve statutes that are by their terms limited to such
accidents. See, e.g., Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66
(1954). Such a concern with one element of direct-action statutes is inappropriate. See
text accompanying note 202 infra.
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It is submitted that the Seider doctrine is fundamentally unsound, whether or not a limited appearance is available to the insured. Even if a direct-action statute of this type is constitutional,165
the creation of such a statute should be a legislative rather than
judicial task. 166 Not only has its judicial creation resulted in difficulties of a constitutional dimension in the original failure to provide for a limited appearance,167 but the development of such a
doctrine through the decisional process leads to confusion as the
lower courts attempt to apply a statute which has not yet been completely formulated. 168 This latter infirmity is characteristic of all
court-made law to some degree, but is especially offensive when the
doctrine is created by a divided court, and when a large number of
fundamental questions are left unanswered. Of the seven judges
deciding Simpson, four disapproved of the Seider decision.169 It is
predictable that the lower courts will experience difficulty in applying a doctrine of which a majority of the highest court in the state
disapproves. The application of the Seider doctrine is further complicated by the variety of unresolved issues involved. It has not yet
been finally determined whether the plaintiff must be domiciled in
New York in order to take advantage of the Seider doctrine,170
whether a direct-action statute must relate only to accidents occurring within the forum state in order to be consitutional, 171 or
whether-and to what extent-res judicata principles apply to a
decision under Seider.17 2 The court system should not be burdened
165. See note 164 supra; Comment, 67 CouJM. L. REv. 550, supra note 130, at 559.
166. See Comment, 53 CoRNELL L. REv. HOS, supra note 130, at lllS-21.
167. See note 161 supra.
168. See, e.g., Powsner v. Mills, 56 Misc. 2d 411, 288 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct., Spec.
Term 1968), in which the court indicated that it was unable precisely to identify the
attached res.
169. Judge Bergen concurred in Judge Breitel's concurring opinion, which was quite
hostile to the doctrine itself. See note 152 supra and accompanying text. Judge Scileppi
concurred in Judge Burke's dissent. 21 N.Y.2d at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d
at 642.
170. See text accompanying notes 193-98 infra.
171. See note 165 supra.
172. Res judicata principles should apply to all issues in a Seider judgment unless
the plaintiff fails to recover the full amount of his claim, in which case there should be
no application of such principles. If the plaintiff has recovered all that he has claimed,
he obviously should not be permitted to bring another action in the defendant's home
state. But if the full amount of his claim has not been recovered, the plaintiff may not
have been fully recompensed for his injury, and the defense-having been conducted
by the insurer whose stake in the litigation is limited-may not have been as vigorous
as it would have been if the insurer had been threatened with unlimited liability. To
apply res judicata principles under these circumstances would therefore be unjustified.
See, e.g., R. CRAMTON &: D. CURIUE, CONFLICT OF LAws 566: "U]udgments resulting from
in rem or quasi in rem proceedings have a limited effect: the plaintiff's cause of action
is not merged, but his claim is reduced by the amount of the property that has been
applied to its payment." These authors further point out that "a default judgment has
a merger effect but generally not a collateral estoppel effect ••.•" Id. at 567. See also
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with such a maze of unanswered questions without a legislative authorization that would probably provide a basis for decision until
the applicable constitutional requirements are clarified by the United
States Supreme Court. As Chief Judge Fuld himself observed, the
matter is more appropriately one for the legislature. 173
Of far greater significance than the impropriety of judicial
establishment of such a doctrine is a matter that cannot be completely
resolved by legislative action. The analysis of the Seider doctrine is
subject to precisely the same infirmity as analysis of any other quasi
in rem proceeding. For while these analyses typically employ standards that are independent of personal-jurisdiction standards, there
is no reason why the limitations on quasi in rem jurisdiction should
be any less stringent than those on in personam jurisdiction.
This infirmity may best be seen in the questionable decision in
Wilcox v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company.174 In that case, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that quasi in rem jurisdiction could
validly be asserted by the attachment of debts owed to the defendant
in New York, even though the same court had earlier held that the
New York long-arm statute could not reach that defendant. 175 The
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Hoxsey v. Hoffpauir, 180 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 953 (1950); George v. Lewis, 204 F. Supp. 380 (D. Colo. 1962);
Note, Effect of a General Appearance to the in Rem Cause in a Quasi in Rem Action,
25 IowA L. REv. 329, 330 (1940). But see Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65
HARV. L. REv. 818, 834 (1952).
173. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 312, 234 N.E.2d 669, 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d
633, 638 (1967).
.
174. 270 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). There may be some vitality to the argument
that quasi in rem proceedings place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. In International Shoe, the Court stated that the argument was not applicable in
that case because Congress specifically had authorized the burden imposed by the State
of Washington through the collection of unemployment compensation charges. 326
U.S. 310, 315 (1945). In Wilcox the court extended this rationale, holding that no argument could be made that a burden on commerce was created because quasi in rem
jurisdiction was expressly granted to the federal courts by Fm. R. CIV. P. 4(e), and that
the rules were passed with congressional consent under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). This
reasoning is not persuasive, because there is a clear difference between specific authorization, as in International Shoe, and the passage of rules with blanket consent from
Congress.
There may well be a difference between long-arm jurisdiction and quasi in rem
jurisdiction on the issue of permissible burdens on commerce, particularly when quasi
in rem jurisdiction is asserted under circumstances that would make in personam jurisdiction impossible. Compare A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLicr OF LAWS 101 (1962) with id.
at 118. See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 986-87 (1960).
Stein, supra note 130, at 1087-93, suggests that the procedure may be unconstitutional
under the commerce clause, but that the question is a difficult one and "need not
be decided if the preferable stance of unconstitutionality on due process grounds is
taken." Id. at 1093.
175. Wilcox v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 269 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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danger in decisions such as this and Seider is, as one author noted
some years ago, that the
plaintiff who must resort to quasi in rem proceedings is seeking to
compel an appearance by ... a defendant who, so far as appears,
has inadequate contact with the state to make him fairly answerable
to a claim there, or who is not of a class of defendants the legislature
has seen fit to subject to the judgments of its courts.176
In addition to this inconsistency and inequity, the development
of quasi in rem jurisdiction under the Seider doctrine has complied
with none of the standards that have been suggested as applicable to
the assertion of in personam jurisdiction. It favors the plaintiff without regard to the extent of the defendant's activities within the state,
even when it is apparent that either the state in which the accident
occurred or the state of the defendant's residence would be a more
appropriate forum in terms of efficiency and minimization of litigation.177 The Seider doctrine also subjects the defendant to jurisdiction when it cannot reasonably be said that he should have expected
to be subjected to jurisdiction,178 and when it cannot be said that he
has committed any purposeful act within the forum state.179 The exercise of long-arm jurisdiction in such a case is inappropriate and
should be unconstitutional under Hanson v. Denckla.180 Under such
circumstances the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction should also
be unconstitutional.181
176. Carrington, The Modem Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L.
REv. 303, 307 (1962).

177. See text accompanying notes 75-90 supra. The state of the accident should be
preferred, because it may be assumed that witnesses will be more readily available
there, and that the law of that state probably will be determinative of liability.
Should the action be brought in the defendant's home state, the courts of that state
are in a position to decline jurisdiction through the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
should they determine that the interests of the parties are not best served by the use of
that forum. See Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. I (1950); Developments in the Law
-State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 174, at 1008-13.
Litigation would be minimized either in the courts of the state in which the accident occurred or in which the defendant resides, since in both forums the defendant's
appearance would be general and there would be no possibility of a need to bring an
additional action to obtain a full vindication of plaintiff's right. See note 172 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 67-74 supra.
179. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). See notes 39-50 supra and accompanying text.
180. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See notes 39-49 supra and accompanying text.
181. The Supreme Court has begun to question the constitutional propriety of quasi
in rem jurisdiction over intangible obligations. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961). Even the district court in Wilcox (see notes 174-75
supra and accompanying text), in upholding quasi in rem jurisdiction, conceded that
[i]t may be that some unfairness inheres in the notion that a mere attachment can
provide a basis for jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to the property
seized. This is particularly true where, as here, it has been J"udicially determined
that jurisdiction cannot be obtained over the person of the efendant.
270 F. Supp. 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Further support for the unconstitutional lack of
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The basis of quasi in rem jurisdiction may best be examined by
reference to Pennoyer v. Neff. 182 Under the Pennoyer doctrine, in
rem and in personam jurisdiction were subject to the same limitations; those limitations were fundamentally based on the power of
the state to adjudicate controversies relating to whomever or whatever might be found within its borders. 183 Quasi in rem jurisdiction
is a hybrid of in rem in personam jurisdiction,184 and therein lies
the difficulty; for while in personam jurisdictional limitations have
changed considerably since Pennoyer, 185 in rem limitations have not.
Thus, the limitations on the hybrid are difficult to ascertain by
reference to original authority.
The classic quasi in rem case is Harris v. Balk, 186 in which the
Supreme Court determined that a debt may be attached wherever
the defendant's debtor may be found. Because this case preceded
International Shoe by forty years, its continuing vitality as valid
authority for determining the limitations on quasi in rem jurisdiction is questionable.187 In any event, the essential constitutional approaches of the two cases are not irreconcilable. In Harris, the Court
determined that the garnished debtor could only claim the garnishment as a defense to an action by the defendant creditor if he had
given that creditor notice of the garnishment proceedings, because
"[£]air dealing requires this."188 The language used is strikingly similar to that of International Shoe and may be read as an indication
that the fair-play concept should apply to both types of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the more recent case of
Hanson v. Denckla189 may fairly be read as implying that Harris, if
still valid, applies only to "ordinary debts" 190 and not to such comfair play involved in this type of quasi in rem assertion of jurisdiction may be found
in Dunn v. Printing Corp. of America, 245 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Carrington,
supra note 176, at 306-09; Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts,
59 MICH, L. REv. 337, 339 (1961); Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 584; Hazard, A General Theory
of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 241, 282; von Mehren &: Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1140-41 (1966);
Comment, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, supra note 133, at 764-65; Comment, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426,
supra note 130, at 1429 n.12; Comment, 67 CoLUM. L, REv. 550, supra note 130, at
565-67.
182. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See notes 14-23 supra and accompanying text.
183. 95 U.S. at 723, 726; Comment, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, supra note 133, at 726-34.
184. See note 2 supra.
185. See notes 28-50 supra and accompanying text.
186. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
187. It has been suggested that Harris no longer serves any purpose and should be
overruled. Comment, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426, supra note 130, at 1441-43.
188. 198 U.S. at 227.
189. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
190. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 223 (1905).
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plex debts as those represented by insurance policies.191 Indeed, the
Harris Court itself stated that "[w]e speak of ordinary debts, such
as the one in this case"-a simple debt of a sum certain by one individual to another.192
The appropriateness of this fair-play approach to quasi in rem
jurisdictional disputes is further substantiated by the New Yark
courts' tacit recognition that they must be wary of due process limitations when applying the Seider doctrine. For example, one lower
court dismissed an action in which the plaintiff was not a New York
resident,193 holding that this dismissal was required on the independent grounds that the doctrine of forum non conveniens194 suggested
it and that due process limitations demanded it.195 Moreover, in the
first Simpson decision, Chief Judge Fuld explicitly considered due
process limitations in the International Shoe sense, and thus concluded that the Seider doctrine could only be applied on behalf of
New York plaintiffs.196 Although Judge Breitel indicated disagreement with that conclusion,197 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has not only accepted Chief Judge Fuld's views,198
but has gone even further in analyzing the attachment of insurance
policies in terms of fair play. In Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Incorporated,199 that court held that jurisdiction could not be sustained
over nonresident defendants by attachment of their insurance policies
even though the•plaintiffs were residents of New York. Because the
plaintiffs were merely administrators of the estates of decedents who
191. Stein, supra note 130, at 1107-08, 1112-13.
192. 198 U.S. at 223.
193. Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968).
194. The doctrine of forum non conveniens asserts that a court should dismiss a
suit, even though that court possesses jurisdiction over the parties, if another forum
exists that is so much more convenient for the parties and the courts that the plaintiff's
privilege of choosing his forum is outweighed. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
507-09 (1947). For a discussion of the doctrine, see Developments in the Law-StateCourt Jurisdiction, supra note 174, at 1008-13. The use of the forum non conveniens
doctrine is subject to considerations similar to those which are determinative of the
jurisdictional issue itself. See Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49
(1950): Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the in Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. R.Ev.
569, 596-602 (1958).
195. 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524-25 (1968). See also Varady v.
Margolis, 303 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
196. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d
633, 637 (1967), motion for reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (per curiam).
197. "[It] will be the rare plaintiff who cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the New
York courts ••••" 21 N.Y.2d at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641 Gudge
Breitel, concurring).
198. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410
F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). See also Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App,
Div. 2d 315, 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524-25 (1968).
199. 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969).
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had not resided in New York, the court stated that a "constitutional
doubt arises from New York's lack of meaningful contact with the
claim."200
Thus, whether by requiring that a plaintiff be a resident of the
forum, or by requiring that the state have a "meaningful contact"
with the claim, the courts in New York have displayed a preoccupation with finding some connection between the forum and the underlying controversy. This concern reflects an implicit recognition
of the applicability of constitutional limitations on the exercise of
in personam jurisdiction to the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
under the Seider doctrine. Since due process limitations on in personam jurisdiction are applicable to quasi in rem proceedings, fair
play should be the ultimate test for quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Analogies to direct-action statutes, the justification for the Seider
doctrine used by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,201 does
not remove the doctrine from scrutiny under principles of fair play.
In analyzing the constitutionality of such a statute, many commentators have expressed a concern whether it is constitutionally required that a direct-action statute apply only to accidents occurring within the forum state.202 Such concern with only one element
of the problem is inappropriate. Rather, the concern should be
whether the statute complies with the fair-play requirements of due
process. The Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of
Louisiana's direct-action statute in Watson v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corporation, Limited203 indicated the importance of such
an examination. The Court placed a great deal of reliance on
Louisiana's interest in "safe-guarding the rights of persons injured
there.'' 204 This emphasis represents an application of the concept
that due process requirements demand that there be some rational
interconnection between the forum and the underlying controversy.
In other words, it is implicitly recognized that before the directaction statute may be constitutionally applied, it must be shown that
there is such a relationship between the state and alleged wrongdoing
that it would not be unfair to require the defendant to defend his
actions there. The application of these considerations in the area of
200. 411 F.2d at 817.
201. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410
F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
202. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 130, at 1100-04; Comment, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550,
supra note 130, at 559; Note, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654, supra note 130, at 655.
203. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
204. 348 U.S. at 73. The impropriety of placing emphasis on the location of the ac•
cident may be recognized by considering an accident in California between two Louisiana residents with Louisiana insurers. Although the accident occurred outside Louisiana, there should be no constitutional objection to the application of a Louisiana
direct-action statute by the Louisiana courts.
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direct-action statutes is essentially identical to their application in
the area of in personam jurisdiction. The Seider doctrine, even considered as a direct-action statute, must therefore be analyzed in terms
of fair play and, so analyzed, cannot stand. For example, it is doubtful whether principles of fair play would allow a New York court to
assert jurisdiction over a Hawaii resident simply because a New
Yorker traveled to Hawaii and there became involved in an accident
with him. The fact that the Hawaiian had been issued an insurance
policy in Hawaii by a New York company does not make such jurisdiction any fairer, since the Hawaiian would have done no act by
which he would have availed himself "of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State" 205 or by which he should expect
to be subjected to New York jurisdiction.206
The very cases that have construed the Seider doctrine, whether
by requiring some connection between the forum and the underlying
controversy207 or by analogizing to direct-action statutes,208 implicitly
recognize that the due process limitations of International Shoe apply
to such quasi in rem proceedings. Sound analysis demands this conclusion. When Harris v. Balk was decided, the Pennoyer rule permitted jurisdiction over the individual to be obtained only by service
of process within the state or by a voluntary appearance.209 It was
therefore proper to assist the plaintiff and provide him with a forum
if he could find a debtor of his adversary within the state. Indeed,
Harris may be regarded as merely one of the exceptions to the Pennoyer rule, which developed from dissatisfaction with the restrictions
of that rule.210 The need for such exceptions having disappeared with
the implementation of methods for greatly expanding the reach of
personal jurisdiction, it would seem to be appropriate to eliminate
the Harris exception itself.211 It is certainly inappropriate to follow
the Seider approach, which expands the reach of that anachronistic
rule. 212
Under the due process clause a defendant may not have his personal rights adjudicated unless it is fair to require his presence before
205. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
206. See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
207. See notes 194-200 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 201-05 supra and accompanying text.
209. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
210. Carrington, supra note 176, at 305-06. See also notes 25-40 supra and accompanying text.
211. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305,311,234 N.E.2d 669,672,287 N.Y.S.2d
633, 637 (1967), motion for reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (per curiam).
212. In discussing the advisability of making attachment and garnishment available
to the federal courts through what is now FED. R. CIV. P. 4(3), one commentator referred to the lack of such bases for jurisdiction in the federal courts as "an anomalous
exception to an anachronistic rule." Carrington, supra note 176, at ll06.
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the adjudicative body. There is no sound defense for the apparent
view of the New York courts that such fairness is not required if,
completely by chance, a defendant has chosen an insurer who does
business in New York. A defendant's constitutional right to fair play
should not vary with the locus of the activities of his insurance company. Similarly, just as the validity of attachment of jurisdiction under the Seider doctrine should not be determined by blind reference
to the location of the defendant's insurance company, the propriety
of attaching other forms of quasi in rem jurisdiction should not be
dependent solely upon the location of a res owned by the defendant,
but should also be made subject to fundamental considerations of
fairness. Only when these considerations of fair play are made an
integral part of the jurisdictional analyses are the requirements of
due process consistently met.

III.

CONCLUSION

A standard such as fair play will necessarily be difficult to apply
in some cases. It has been suggested that such a standard is undesirable as a constitutional guide because it subjects the rights of parties
to the subjective judgments of judges.213 Nonetheless, fair play is the
standard by which the limitations on a court's jurisdiction currently
must be judged.
As a result of the indeterminate nature of the standard, various
commentators have limited their efforts to an examination of the
considerations relevant to determining the outer limits of jurisdiction. Such examinations are valuable and necessary when the extreme
case, which tests those limits, is under consideration. However, those
commentaries should not cloud the basic issue and thereby interfere
with the jurisdictional determination in cases that fall well within
permissible limits. The focus of the courts, in the first instance, must
be on the question of fair play. It is only when that question cannot
be answered easily that other considerations become relevant to the
analysis.
This fair-play standard should be applied to both in personam
and quasi in rem proceedings. An exception may be tolerated in the
usual in rem action, because a state does have an interest in determining the rights to property within its borders. That interest, however, is inapplicable to quasi in rem actions. To subject an individual
to jurisdiction, whether directly by in personam proceedings or indirectly through quasi in rem proceedings, is to deny him due process
of law unless he has committed some act making it fair to require
that he defend in that state.
213. H.
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